Manufactured export performance of Brazil in the ALADI market: Preferential entry and comparative status by Herken-Krauer, Juan-Carlos
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Herken-Krauer, Juan-Carlos
Working Paper
Manufactured export performance of Brazil in the
ALADI market: Preferential entry and comparative
status
Kiel Working Papers, No. 299
Provided in cooperation with:
Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW)
Suggested citation: Herken-Krauer, Juan-Carlos (1987) : Manufactured export performance of
Brazil in the ALADI market: Preferential entry and comparative status, Kiel Working Papers, No.
299, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/47043Kieler Arbeitspapiere
Kiel Working Papers
Kiel Working Paper No. 299
Manufactured Export Performance of Brazil
in the ALADI Market:




Institut fur Wfeltwirtschaft an der Universitat Kiel
ISSN 0342-0787Kiel Institute of World Economics
Department IV •-,
Diisternbrooker Weg 120, D-2300 Kiel
Kiel Working Paper No. 299
Manufactured Export Performance of Brazil
in the ALADI Market:




The author himself, not the Kiel Institute of World
Economics, is solely responsible for the contents and
distribution of each Kiel Working Paper.
Since the series involves manuscripts in a preliminary
form, interested readers are requested to direct criti-
cisms and suggestions directly to the author and to
clear any quotations with him.- 1
*
I. Introduction
Brazil's expansion of manufactured exports over the last decade
has been spectacular. As recent analysis on the determinants of
Brazilian exports of manufactures suggests [Fasano-Filho, Fi-
scher, Nunnenkamp, 1987], there is no uniform set of factors
which have determined export expansion in all major markets in
the same way. Instead, to different degrees there are market-
specific explanations of growth of Brazilian manufactured ex-
ports. As a result, a more disaggregated investigation of the
relevant markets by regions and sectors might give a clearer and
more accurate insight of the real sources of Brazilian success in
specific export markets. Such a market could be the Latin Ameri-
can countries linked to each other through a number of multi- or
bilateral trade agreements. If such agreements would result in a
privileged market access for member countries Brazil's exports
could be expected to penetrate more deeply into Latin American
countries, not necessarily due to lower production costs compared
to non-member countries' exports, but because of tariff- and non-
tariff barriers against these countries excluded from the agree-
ments. If this were the case, i.e., if Brazil is enjoying a size-
able privileged access, two basic questions must be answered:
- what is the concrete impact of preferential trade arrangements
upon actual sectorial Brazilian exports;
- secondly, as most of those agreements cover only a short period
and are subject to frequent politically induced changes, what
are the consequences for the continuity and future perspectives
of Brazilian exports to the markets of Latin American coun-
tries.
The two questions are of particular relevance to the trade of
Brazil with the member countries of ALADI (Asociacion Latino-
americana de Integraci&n), the Latin American trade arrangement
that superseded ALALC (Asociacion Latinoamericana de Libre Comer-
The author gratefully acknowledges many helpful comments and
suggestions by R. Langhammer and B. Fischer.- 2 -
cio). They are less important for the trade with Central American
countries whose own integration schemes are only loosely connect-
ed to ALADI members through membership in the all-Latin American
discussion and consultation forum SELA (Sistemo Economico Latino-
americano) and are much less institutionalized. Again, the rele-
vance of the specific trade barriers against third countries in
the framework of ALADI must be gauged at a very disaggregate
level, because of the highly discretionary, temporary and sector-
specific character of ALADI regulations.
At the same time, the profound economic recession of the early
1980s has drastically affected the level and pattern of foreign
trade flows in the area with an overall cut in imports because of
severe balance of payments problems. The picture resulting from
the last years makes it difficult to evaluate the effect of re-
gional trade agreements, as many countries imposed ad-hoc re-
strictions on the inflow of foreign goods or tried to channel
significant proportions of goods exchange through special mecha-
nisms like barter trade, state trading and government procure-
ment.
With the very first signs of economic recovery in 1984, there has
been a renewed effort towards improving the existing trade agree-
ments within ALADI. Argentina and Brazil, in particular, seem
prepared to advance further than the other members and to go
bilaterally, above all in key sectors of the manufacturing indus-
try. All this could suggest that a new phase in the economic
integration of Latin America might be in the making, which could
eventually imply an upgrading of the Argentine market for Brazil.
This study presents first a brief overview of the efforts towards
creating a free trade area in Latin America (Chapter II); it then
reviews the developments of preferential trade policies since the
foundation of ALADI in 1980 (Chapter III) as well as the develop-
ment and patterns of preferential and non-preferential intra-
trade in the area (Chapter IV), with special reference to Brazi-
lian exports of manufactures to the other members of ALADI. A
presentation of some hypotheses beyong preferential treatment_ O _
regarding the determinants of Brazilian exports to the regional
market in Chapter V is complemented with an analysis of ALADI
latest developments (Chapter VI) and prospects (Chapter VII).
II. Institutional Origin and Evolution of ALADI
ALALC was created in 1960 as a "free trade area" to be completed
by 1973. The main ideas behind the scheme were essentially relat-
ed to the assumptions that
- Latin American countries were facing long-term deteriorating
terms of trade,
- access to the markets in the developed countries (DCs) was
going to become more difficult because of protectionism [Alva-
rez Garcia and Martins, 1982, p. 67.], and,
- particularly in the case of Argentina and Brazil, given econo-
mies of scale for their basic industries were only attainable
within the framework of a protected regional market.
Although about 80 per cent of intra-regional trade in the 1950s
was already being conducted through special bilateral or multila-
teral trade arrangements, this system was excessively cumbersome
and different to maintain. The push towards a regional multila-
teral trade agreement was also limited by the fact that only a
strictly defined "free trade area" was allowed as an exception
from the "most favoured nations" treatment within the framework
of Art. XXIV of the GATT
1.
Argentina and Brazil were the essential engines behind the
schemes, but it was actually their own interest to protect their
industrial sectors which ultimately contributed to the failure
of the initial objectives of the association. Neither of the two
GATT (1961: pp. 21-22 and pp. 87-88). The GATT Working Party
formed to check the legal conformity of the Treaty of Monte-
video, the ALALC founding act, with Art. XXIV never arrived to
a decision.- 4 -
countries - by far the biggest markets in the region - was will-
ing to make substantial concessions in the field of manufactured
goods, while trade in agricultural products was actually comple-
mentary. Attempts of national and foreign entrepreneurs to use
some of the smaller countries as a host to penetrate the larger
markets of Argentina and- Brazil also failed, amidst continuous
and heated commercial and political disputes among all countries
concerned. At the same time, though Brazil started to make some
penetrations in the smaller markets, these flows were either
outside the margin of ALALC schedules, or - due to a variety of
reasons which had nothing to do with preference margins - more
competitive than alternative suppliers. Brazil was at the end in
a better position to reach favourable bilateral arrangements
outside the ALALC preferential tariff arrangements than to mani-
pulate the ALALC for its own purposes. At the same time Argentina
was being submerged into a formidable crisis, reneging or creat-
ing obstacles for the implementation of preferential tariff
treatment, even for some of the smaller countries whose infant
industries were unable to put Argentine industries under strong
adjustment pressure.
The initial objective of reaching a definitive free trade area by
1973 was first postponed until 1980, but this was also not at-
tained. Regardless of the question whether the ALALC really be-
came a free trade area or only remained a preferential trading
arrangement with less than a hundred per cent discrimination, the
key question addresses the integration-induced changes in intra-
and extraregional trade flows. More concretely, it has to be ana-
lyzed whether the arrangements promoted intra-regional trade at
the cost of less efficient domestic production (trade creation)
or at the cost of more efficient extra-regional trade (trade
diversion). In the three most important markets of the region,
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, the results of a research for the
period 1962/63-1977/78 indicate that the absolute amounts of
diversion were small compared to the growth of total manufactured- 5 -
imports from all sources (Langhammer and Spinanger, 1984: pp.
56-63). Manufactured imports from third countries were practical-
ly not affected by the trade diversion; most of the increases in
the relative share of imports from LAFTA members were done
through the creation of new markets and not through the substitu-
tion of established trading relationships. Yet, the share of
trade diversion in the growth of import from ALALC countries was
found to be high.
In 1978 the member countries decided to restructure the organi-
zation, and by 1980 they reached an agreement on a new type of
economic integration, no longer along the lines of a free trade
area, but as a new looser type of "South-South" cooperation. The
background of this new type was the Tokyo Round of the GATT fi-
nalized in 1979, where the GATT-members agreed on the possibility
that developing countries could grant themselves preference mar-
gins less than hundred per cent without violating the GATT rules.
As a whole, the new organization, ALADI, gave up the objective of
a strict multilateral trade agreement, and centered itself on the
coordination of bilateral and multilateral agreements. In 1983
the member countries agreed that all the concessions and prefer-
ential treatments obtained under the ALALC should be transferred
to the new organization. It was not prior to April 1984 that they
approved a tentative and multilateral preferential tariff scheme,
to be implemented as from 1986.
III. Structure, Regulations and Effectiveness of ALADI
Although the long-term objective of ALADI still consists of the
creation of an almost fully integrated area - a Latin American
common market -, its present objective is - and probably will be
for the foreseeable future - the establishment of a regional
preference area ("area de preferencia econ&mica") , consisting of
three basic instruments (ALADI, 1980: p. 3):- 6 -
a) a regional customs preference system ("preferencia arancela-
ria regional"), which aims to cover the whole custom uni-
verse. It is allowed to vary on its regulations according to
economic sectors and should also theoretically eliminate
non-tariff restrictions. Safeguard clauses such as exception
lists ("listas de excepciones") for those member countries of
relative less economic development are explicitely laid out
in the scheme.
b) regional agreements aimed at promoting economic integration,
trade promotion, scientific and technological cooperation,
etc.
c) partial trade agreements ("acuerdos de alcance parcial") ,
which allow two or more member countries to agree on specific
trade flows, but whose concessions can be extended automati-
cally to those countries which are considered to be at a
lower stage of economic development.
The countries are classified according to their level of income
as follows:
a) low income countries: Bolivia, Ecuador and Paraguay;
b) middle income countries: Colombia, Chile, Peru, Uruguay and
Venezuela;
c) high income countries: Argentina, Brazil and Mexico.
At the same time, Uruguay and the landlocked countries are grant-
ed other special treatments. This hierarchy serves the purpose to
guarantee exports of "less-developed" members reflected in a
proportionately greater preference margins entering the markets
of the "more-developed" members. Yet, the criterion used in the
classification has little to do with standard indicators of de-
velopment, as Paraguay has a higher GDP per capita than Colombia- 7 -
and.-Peru, while Uruguay and Venezuela also have a higher level
than Brazil or Mexico . The true guideline underlying this hier-
archy seems to have been the level of industrialization and ex-
port competitiveness of the members as Brazil, Mexico and Argen-
tina exhibit the highest shares of industrial output in GDP, and
the highest share of manufactures in total exports .
A first step towards a regional customs preference system was
taken in April 1984, when the member countries agreed on a provi-
sional Regional Tariff Preference (RTP) scheme, establishing
initial percentage rates of tariff preferences to be implemented
as from 1986. Table 1 presents the RTP for all countries, as a
percentage reduction of custom duties. The rates, which are broad
averages for all imports, are not likely - according to an ALADI
study - to produce a large trade diversion. Moreover, partial
and bilateral trade agreements will probably change the picture
which may emerge from these low values of average regional tariff
preferences.
The same study presents an estimation of the "price-preference"
(PP) - see Table 2 - calculated on the basis of average import
duties applicable for 1982. The PP consists of the maximum per-
centage by which the FOB price of a regional product may exceed
the FOB price of third countries, or, in other words, the per-
centage by which, on account of a given tariff preference, the
regional exporter may increase the price vis-a"-vis international
competition. The "effective preference" by means of the RTP, is
the percentage by which regional exporters may increase the price
in terms of the product value added, as a result of the tariff
1 Sintesis ALADI, 10/86, October 1986. Data for 1984, in US$ at
1982 prices.
2
Sintesis ALADI, 10/86, October 1986. Average of shares of in-
dustrial output for 1981-84; level of exports comprises data
for 1984.
'Possible effects of larger RTP cuts on intra-regional trade
1,
ALADI Newsletter, 5/85, p. 4-5.- 8 -









































































































































Source: ALADI Newsletter, 9-10/85, p. 4-5 *
preference and of origin rules. The same study calculates, assum-
ing a mini-mum value added requirement of 50 per cent, that these
effective preference rates would range from 0.2 to 2.4 per cent,
twice the "price-preference" shown in Table 2.
Given cost advantages of third country products such small pre-
ference margins are unlikely to cause per se significant trade
diversion. ALADI experts estimate that a 10 per cent "price-pre-
ference" could be the first level likely to have a concrete im-— 9 —
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Source: ALADI Newsletter, 9-10/85, p. 4-5.
pact, which mean that RTP rates should increase by between 50 to
100 per cent (ALADI Newsletter, 9-10/85, pp. 4-5). An inter-mini-
sterial meeting which took place in July of 1986 in Mexico agreed
on two further steps. The current RTP would be doubled up to a
basic 10 per cent preferential cut, as from April of 1987. At the
same time, a regional substitution programme of third country
imports was to take effect as from April of 1987. The aim of this- 10 -
programme was to increase intra-regional trade by 40 per cent
over the period 1987/89, and the list of goods affected was sup-
posed to cover about 30 percent of ALADI imports from third coun-
tries (Sintesis ALADI, 4/86, July-August). All instruments clear-
ly gear at costly trade diversion rather than at intensifying
competition between domestically produced goods and substitutes
from ALADI partners.
Among all these instruments, the one of more concrete short-term
importance has been until now the so-called partial trade agree-
ment, which has been duly used since 1980 for the regulation of
trade flows. This type of agreement must have a duration of a
minimum of one year (ALADI, 1980, pp. 6-7), can cover every type
of trade flows, can also include non-tariff restrictions and do
make possible the renegotiation or nullification of former agree-
ments. Furthermore, they can only be used to promote trade be-
tween the member countries, and more important, it can also cover
trade purchases made by the state or state-controlled enterprises
in each country member. Again, the impact of this instrument is
to divert trade from non-member countries to the preferred ALADI
partner.
A very extensive list of partial trade agreements covering almost
exclusively the field of manufactured goods, has been in opera-
tion since 1980 [see Appendix Al]. Though the type, duration and
relevance of the agreements vary considerable, some of them do in
fact constitute very tightly arranged pacts aimed at channelling
the trade flows of some products in a bilateral direction. The
1983 agreement on the steel industry signed by Brazil, Mexico,
Argentina and Venezuela, for example , stipulates that purchases
of state corporations in each member country must be directed to
the other members, and that offers by non-signatory countries can
be overridden by the signatory-countries within a prescribed
margin of prices. It formally establishes, overall, a policy of
"compre latinoamericano" in the field of steel products.
ALADI, Industrias en la Zona, No. 85, 1984, pp. 17-20.- 11 -
Similar type of agreements have been signed on the field of pulp
and paper, chemical and pharmaceutical, machinery and tools,
electronics, household goods , though in most cases the latter
agreements concentrate on the establishment of preferential tar-
iff concessions rather than on restrictions on the purchases of
goods by state-corporations or "first priority" for Latin Ameri-
can products.
2
In some cases, the percentage preferential margin granted to
Brazil - but also enjoyed by other ALADI countries - is consider-
able, ranging usually between 80-90 per cent. A 1982 agreement
between Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay on household goods
reveals such range of preference, though Argentina granted in
some cases much lower rates (between 34 per cent and 2.6 per
4
cent). In the electronics sector , an agreement between the same
four countries indicates a more even range of preferences, 80-90
per cent. Various agreements signed by Argentina, Brazil, Mexico
and Venezuela, in the chemical industry also stipulate a range
of preference of between 95-60 per cent, though Venezuela's tar-
iffs are fairly low (between 15 and 1 per cent).
See ALADI, Industrias en la Zona, No. 83-87.
2
The percentage preferential margin is defined as
PPR =
 X^ . 100, where x = duties on imports from third coun-
x tries, and y = duties on imports from signa-
tory countries.
3 NABALALC (Nomenclatura Arancelaria para la Asbciacion Latino-
americana de Libre Comercio) positions 85.06.1.99, 85.12.1.07,
84.40.1.01, ALADI, Industrias en la Zona No. 80, 1982.
4 NABALALC positions 85.15.1, 85.01, 85.13, 85.19. ALADI, Indus-
trias en la Zona No. 83, 1983.
5 NABALALC positions 29.13, 29.01, 29.08, 29.16, 29.28, 29.31,
34.03, 38.19. ALADI, Industrias en la Zona No. 85 and 86, 1984.- 12 -
IV. Evolution of Intraregional Trade in General and Brazil's
Exports in Particular
Overall, during the last two decades Brazil's foreign trade with
ALADI members -has not changed substantially, in terms of the
geographical distribution of its exports. Between 1970-73 exports
to ALADI represented about 10-12 per cent of total exports; be-
tween 1981-82 the ratio stood at between 13-15 per cent
1. In
1983-84 this ratio went down to about 10 per cent, with total
Brazilian exports dropping from a peak of above US$ 4.0 billion
in 1981 to about US$ 2.5 billion. This is still in line with the
contraction of imports in Latin America, including intra-regional
imports, as ,can be seen in Table 3. However, when analysed in
terms of exports of manufactures, the picture is different. The
significance of ALADI for Brazil exports of manufactures has
declined if compared with other export markets. From an average
of about 4 0 per cent of total exports of manufactures in the
early 1970s, ALADI countries represented about 20 per cent in the
early 1980s, with an abrupt decline to a share of 13 per cent in
1983-84 . Yet, in absolute terms, the amount of exports to ALADI
has kept increasing, if we disregard the abrupt fall during the
last three years which indicates the effect of balance of pay-
ments restrictions of partner countries rather than the dete-
rioration of preferential market access. Contrasting to the geo-
graphical distribution, the sectoral composition of manufactured
exports of Brazil to ALADI member countries has undergone some
noteworthy changes. In 1962 basic manufactures (SITC 6) had a 24
per cent of their markets in ALADI a share which was raised to
30 per cent in 1981 (Nunnenkamp and Fasano-Filho, 1986, p. 12).
1 ALADI, Estadisticas de Comercio Exterior, 1970-1982, p. 1.
2
We use the concept of "manufactures" for the items 5,6,7, and 8
of SITC for all years up to 1981, and the roughly similar clas-
sification of the Banco do Brasil for the most recent years.
Other reports tend to exclude items 67 and 68 of the SITC (iron
and steel; non-ferrous metals) of their concept of manufact-





























































































































Source: ALADI, Estadisticas de Comercio Exterior, Montevideo, 1983; ALADI, Newsletter 1/85, pp. 2-3,des Institute
WeJtwirtschaft Kiel
- 14 -
Machinery and transport equipment (SITC 7) is another important
item, though the share of ALADI declined from 66 per cent in 1962
to about 46.5 per cent in 1981 (Nunnenkamp and Fasano-Filho,
1986, p. 12). In total, and abstracting from the usual abrupt
oscillations in trade flows between developing countries, some of
the ALADI members still represent an important market for inter-
mediate and capital goods originating in Brazil.
Yet, the whole picture is not easy to interpret. On the one hand,
the sporadic and fairly unsuccessful efforts towards freer intra-
regional trade in Latin America has meant that a growing propor-
tion of trade between the member countries of the ALADI-ALALC
group has been channelled outside the negotiated schedules of
tariff and non-tariff restrictions. Total intra-regional imports
in ALADI rose from US$ 1,352 million in 1970 to US$ 10,562 mil-
lion in 1982 , declining to US$ 8356 in 1984 (Table 3). The share
2
of negotiated trade declined from 69 per cent in 1970 to 23 per
cent between 1981-82, though it rose to an average of 27 per cent
in 1983/1984. Brazilian imports from member countries conducted
through negotiated schedules also declined from 73 per cent in
1970 to an average of 17 per cent in 1981-82. Looking at the pat-
terns that evolved in some of the most important markets for
Brazil - Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Venezuela - one encounters
the same trend. This could suggest, at the first sight, that a
growing proportion of Brazil exports to ALADI has also been chan-
nelled outside the product coverage of the ALADI-ALALC preferen-
tial arrangements.
In general, the following findings emerge from the pattern of
intra-Latin American trade during the seventies and early eigh-
ties :
1 ALADI, Estadisticas de Comercio Exterior, 1970-82, Table 4.
The "comercio negociado" is still calculated under the old
schedules of ALALC, not of ALADI; ALADI, Estadisticas de
Comercio Exterior, 1970-1982, p. III.- 15 -













































































































































































Source: ALADI, Newsletter, 9-10/85.- 16 -
Total intra-regional trade rose steadily up to the early
1980s, despite a continuous decline of the fraction of trade
covered by the LAFTA-ALADI schemes; it dropped drastically
in 1983-84.
Brazilian exports to the area continued to rise, which meant
that also a growing proportion of Brazilian exports has not
been regulated within the framework of ALALC-ALADI.
The slight increase in the share of negotiated trade in
19 83-84 - under the new schemes of ALADI - does not yet
allow for conclusions on the stability of upward changes in
shares or even a new trend.
It should, however, be noted that the relative failure of a gene-
ralised multilateral reduction of tariffs does not mean necessa-
rily that Brazilian exports to the area have not enjoyed a signi-
ficant preferential entry, compared with third countries. Many
exports from Brazil originally conducted through ALALC-ALADI
schedules might have continued thereafter on a strictly bilateral
basis. Brazilian exporters could have gained initially a strong
foothold in those markets, under the protection of the ALALC
schemes, and remained in the leading position even when those
preferential tariff concessions were removed. At the same time,
as will be discussed below, non-tariff barriers, neighbouring and
bordering traffic, bilateral sectoral intra-industry arrange-
ments, and the key role of state trading and procurement, could
have contributed to increased Brazil exports to the area.
From the detailed analysis of Brazil exports by countries and
sectors, some clear trends emerged. First of all, the share of
manufactured exports to total exports in ALADI and in each member
country has increased steadily. Though this is consistent with
the changes in the sectoral composition of Brazilian world ex-
ports, in the case of ALADI the ratio went beyond the 80 per cent
since the early 1980s (Table 5). For some small- and medium-sized
markets like Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru and Boli-
via, Brazilian exports are almost exclusively composed of manu-
factures. Secondly, machinery and transport equipment (SITC 7)
represent the most important sector, accounting for more than 50























































































































































































































































































































































































Source: UN Camodity Trade Statistics, various issues; Banco Central do Brasil, Boletim Mensal, March 1986- 18 -
At the regional level, two patterns are clearly distinguishable:
- In those sectors of higher value added, heavy use of physical
capital and relative high degree of technological know-how, the
intra-regional trade concentrates almost exclusively on Argen-
tina, Brazil and Mexico. However, non-ALADI sources of supply
still dominate. Furthermore, 90 per cent of ALADI sales were
made by Argentina, Brazil and Mexico; 80 per cent of ALADI pur-
chases were made by the above mentioned countries, plus Vene-
zuela. A recent study on five key groups of capital goods
indicates, that between 1978-84, of US$ 27.6 billion value of
imports, only US$ 1.6 billion came from ALADI-members, while
overall ALADI exports represented US$ 2.8 billion (ALADI News-
letter, May-June 1985, p. 4).
- Overall, Brazil exports of manufactures present some degree of
concentration on two regional classifications. First of all,
about 70 per cent of the exports of manufactures in the period
1981-84 concentrated in the Southern Cone, i.e. Argentina,
Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay, though this ratio was
much higher in the early 1970s (above 80 per cent). Secondly,
considerable and systematic gains have been made in countries
like Venezuela, Chile and Paraguay, which are the one exhibit-
ing the relatively lesser degree of non-tariff restrictions in
the ALADI area [Appendix A2]. The substantial gains in Paraguay
and Uruguay could also be ascribed to the special advantages of
bordering trade.
Yet, the view on the importance of ALADI as an export market of
Brazil only allows to assess the accessability of this market
relative to other export markets and this accessability is
determined by size and growth of the markets as well as by
importing country's interventions into imports. It does not
provide an answer to the question whether the bilateral ar-
rangements secured a competitive edge of Brazilian exports vis-
The five sectors are: boilers, food-processing equipment, agri-
cultural machinery, construction machinery and equipment, pumps
and compressors.- 19 -
Table 6 - Structure of Brazil's Manufactured Exports to ALADI Member Countries, 1970-1984
SITC 5 SITC 6 SITC 7 SITC 8 Total
exports
Year Million Million Share" Million Share" Million Share" Million Share"
of US-$ of US-$ of US-$ of US-$ of US-$
1970 302.7 8.7 5.9 69.3 47.3 63.2 43.2 5.1 3.4
1975 1197.0 61.3 7.7 229.6 28.9 426.9 53.8 74.9 9.4

























aShare of the SITC category in total manufactured exports to ALADI. - As from 1982 the
Banco do Brasil classification of exports was used.
Source: UN Commodity Trade Statistics, various issues. - Banco Central do Brasil, Boletim
Mensal, March 1986.- 20 -
a-vis competing exports of other countries to the same market.
To respond to this question, it is necessary to analyze shifts in
trade shares in the importing country. In the following we focus
on the most important bilateral trade pattern in the ALALC, the
Brazil-Argentine case and the performance of Brazil on the Argen-
tine market. Looking at the evolution of the share of Brazilian
imports and the unit value of Brazilian imports in the Argentina
market between 1974-83 (Tables Al and A2) the following shifts
can be observed:
- The Brazilian share of the import market in Argentina improved
only in some sectors, particularly medicinal and pharmaceutical
products, fertilizers, and road vehicles;
- In sectors like iron and steel shapes, iron and steel tubes and
pipes, and domestic electric equipment, the shares have remain-
ed either stable or very erratic;
- In the group of agricultural machinery, a steady increase in
the Brazilian share was followed by an abrupt decline;
- In only three sectors Brazil reveals a substantial market pene-
tration of between 25 and 50 percent: fertilizers, domestic
electric equipment and photo and cinema supplies.
As a result, no systematic trend towards stronger or weaker Bra-
zilian penetration into the manufactured goods market of Argenti-
na comprising all industries can be detected. In addition, there
does not seem to exist a consistent link of changes in trade
shifts with changes in preference margins and the concomitant
change in prices of Brazilian goods relative to third country
products. This inconclusive finding supports the view that in-
struments other than preference margins operate in favour of
Brazilian suppliers on ALADI market and that these instruments
became effective mainly via non-price measures.- 21 -
V. Further Determinants of Brazil's Manufactured Exports to
ALADI Markets: Some Hypotheses
Our analysis has shown that the ALADI markets as such cannot be
considered as an homogeneous and stable outlet for Brazilian
manufactured goods. This has been partly due to the cyclical and
continuously disrupted and renegotiated multi- and bilateral
trade arrangements creating uncertainty with respect to the sta-
bility of the trade policy framework. At the same time, the
switch from comprehensive multilateral trade agreements in ALALC
to bilateral and restricted multilateral agreements in ALADI has
meant a greater and growing fragmentation of intra-regional mar-
kets, each obeying different set of rules. In addition to the
instability of preferential trade policies, balance of payments
crises of Latin American countries have made the access to the
markets even more difficult to anticipate. Though quantity re-
strictions in general affect all trading partners, it may have
not been too far from reality to assume that imports from ALADI
countries were assessed to be less "essential" than imports from
developed countries. Hence, they may have faced tighter restric-
tions than imports from non-ALADI sources.
A disaggregate sectorial approach might illuminate better the
real conditions which prevailed for Brazilian exporters, for
instance. Even though some of the empirical evidence available
can only indirectly testify as to the linkages between preferen-
tial tariff treatment and export success, it is obvious that
overall Brazil exports of manufactures to ALADI cannot be ex-
plained only by implicit protection against third countries. In
some sub-sectors the ALADI mechanisms have probably played no
role at all. At the same time, the ALADI markets are of key
significance for some Brazilian manufactured goods, but the suc-
cess in those markets must be analysed both within and outside
the trade policy framework of ALADI. Compared to non-Latin Ameri-
can trading partners Brazil has other institutional advantages in
directing exports to ALADI countries which cannot be ascribed
only to special trade arrangements:- 22 -
First, a very important feature of the demand for imports coming
from ALADI is the prominence of the role of central government
and state corporations. It is estimated that about 40 per cent of
total demand for imports (Sintesis ALADI, 9/85, pp. 4-5) origi-
nates from the public sector, and one may add the indirect con-
trol that the government may exert in some sectors. Most of this
demand is for intermediate and capital goods; in a sector like
equipments for electricity generation (Sintesis ALADI, 6/86, pp.
3-4) , state corporations represent about 80 per cent of total
demand. Given also the prominence of the state in the production
and distribution spheres of manufacturing industry in Brazil, and
the numerous bilateral agreements in which state purchases are
specifically directed to country members, it may be possible to
count this feature as an important determinant of some type of
exports as well. It should also be noted, that this type of
state-to-state transactions usually enjoys preferential credit
arrangements, and is also likely to overcome more easily non-
tariff barriers.
Second, counter or barter trade has been playing a more substan-
tial role in international transactions, particularly between
developing countries; Brazil is considered a leader in counter-
trade operations, and many swaps of Brazilian manufactures for
raw materials from ALADI members (particularly oil) are being
effected systematically (Rubin, 1986) . A recent United Nations
survey on barter trade also pointed out the growing importance of
barter trade for developing countries, particularly Brazil. In
the ALADI market a key feature has been the implementation of
barter trade between Brazilian steel products, auto-parts, and
other manufactured goods, exchanged for raw materials (United
Nations, 1986) .
Third, Brazilian access to these markets might also have been
heavily determined by a more flexible exchange rate policy than
that of its neighbours, making Brazilian goods outside and within
the ALADI arrangements lists more competitive than the domestic
products. A recent study (Anderson, 1985, pp. 3-17) suggests that
the real value of the Brazilian currency depreciated consider-- 23 -
ably against most ALADI members, particularly between 1973-75 and
since 1980 . In general, exchange rate movements can be expected
to have a larger impact on differences between domestic prices
and prices of substitutes from ALADI partner countries than pre-
ferential tariffs. It may even occur that tariff cuts remain
ineffective in terms of shifting demand towards imports because
of countervailing exchange rate movements. This issue of the
divergence in the real exchange rates between ALADI members is
also relevant for the determinants of so-called tariff redundan-
cy. A study on the case of Argentina concludes for the period
1977-79, that positive tariff redundancy - that is a higher nomi-
nal protection than necessary to equilibrate differences between
domestic and international prices - became smaller largely be-
cause of the increase domestic prices. This increase had a great-
er importance in reducing redundancy than devaluation had in
maintaining it that the reduction of tariffs was more than com-
pensated by the rate of devaluation (Marques and Wogart, 1985:
pp. 25-27). Although these results cannot be extrapolated for
every partner and all periods, it nevertheless accentuates the
fact that divergent monetary economic policies undermine the
effectiveness of tariff concessions.
Fourth, intra-Latin American freight costs may differ from those
of third countries, particularly in the La Plata area, e.g.,
(Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay), and also with Venezuela. This is
suggested by the skewed distribution of Brazil manufactured ex-
ports towards that sub-region.
Fifth, intra-industry trade has become increasingly important for
some industrial sectors in Brazil - automotive and machinery -
2
and again this trend seem to be concentrated in the Plata area .
A similar conclusion is reached for some countries, including
Brazil, in the BID-INTAL study "El Margen de Preferencia Aran-
celario y sus Efectos en el Comercio Intra-ALALC", 1980, p.
16) .
2
Balassa (1978) stressed the high degree of intra-industry trade
between Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. Silber [1983, p. 90] also
suggests that multinational corporations in Brazil export more
manufactures to the ALADI market than domestic firms.- 24 -
VI. Latest Developments in the ALADI Market
Since the early 1980s, and partly because of the acute economic
crisis in some ALADI members, talks of restructuring and expand-
ing the framework of ALADI have been intensified. Political
changes in Brazil and Argentina have given a new prospect to
further advancements towards a "Latin American Common Market".
Both countries have signed recently some agreements towards
speeding-up trade in the area, covering also manufactured goods.
Three new features, of potential concrete importance for the
trade performance of Brazil in the area, have emerged clearly:
First, there is a new approach towards economic integration in
the area, based essentially on a broad political and regional
framework. Greater integration of markets will centre on those
neighbouring countries that not only share some basic political
values, but which are also well-endowed with communications and
cost-efficient transport systems.
Second, on the side of Brazil, there is the belief that the coun-
try is prepared to play the undisputed hegemonic role in the
region, having pursued a more outward-oriented trade policy that
its neighbours, and having gained consequently international
competitiveness in many fields of the manufacturing industry.
Whether inside or outside the institutional framework of ALADI, a
clear strategy has emerged in both public and private sectors in
Brazil: the area should be regarded as a Brazil hinterland, and
Brazilian presence in those markets be maintained and expanded.
Third, on the side of Brazil neighbours, and particularly Argen-
tina, there is also the belief that only an effective commercial
coupling with Brazil will enable them to regain economic dynamics
and share some of the benefits obtained by the biggest economy of
the region in other regions of the world. This should mean a
greater access to home markets for Brazilian manufactured prod-
ucts. Studies for Argentina indicate that most Brazilian products- 25 -
in the steel and auto industry are between 40-50 per cent cheaper
than the Argentine counterparts .
Considerable attention has been given to the set of agreements
signed between Argentina and Brazil at the beginning of August
2
1986 . The four specific agreements aim at intensifying the pro-
gramme of economic integration and cooperation between the two
countries. Besides two deals covering Brazil imports of wheat and
projects in the area of the food industry, the third document
arranges the renegotiation of the Partial. Trade Agreement signed
within ALADI, excluding the list of items classified as "capital
goods" which constitutes the core of the most important under-
standing achieved between the two countries. This latter agree-
ment - whose list of items is still to be agreed upon - elimi-
nates all tariff and non-tariff restrictions on the common list
of both countries. It proposes an overall level of bilateral
trade in capital goods of US$ 2.0 billion for the next four
years .
The agreement further stipulates that by 1990 the common list
will cover at least 50 per cent of the total sample of capital
goods agreed; in all purchases of the public sector, and in im-
ports directly or indirectly originated from the public sector
goods of Argentine or Brazilian origin will be treated as domes-
tic ones. In public tenders, Argentine and Brazilian goods which
are not registered in the common list, will enjoy a reduction of
50 per cent of the level of protection granted in the price of
local products. At the same time, it is agreed that both coun-
tries will effect a similar tariff treatment for third countries,
of a level sufficient to direct the imports towards each one.
Third country import component in the common list is set at a
maximum of 20 per cent. Preliminary figures suggest that a sub-
La Naci&n, Buenos Aires, 14.7.1986, pp. 6-7.
The complete text of the agreements has been taken from La
Nacion, 4.8.1986, p. 5.
3 The targets for the years 1987 to 1990 are: 1987: US$ 300 mil-
lion; 1988: US$ 400 million; 1989: US$ 550 million; 1990: US$
750 million (La Nacion, 4.8.1986, p. 5).- 26 -
stantial increase in bilateral trade from an average of US$ 1.4
billion in 1986 has taken place (La Naci&n, Buenos Aires, 20.7.
87). New agreements have been signed recently, extending the
initial period of validity of the preferential trade arrangements
until 1999, and-creating at the same time a common monetary unit
for the bilateral exchange, the gaucho .
The experience has shown that many of these commercial and econo-
mic integration plans have been very difficult to implement,
notwithstanding the fact that bilateralism is a typical second-
best phenomenon with rather high costs in terms of resource mis-
allocation. However, greater economic urgency on the part of its
neighbours might mean that Brazilian access to ALADI markets
could be expanded in the field of manufactured goods, both be-
cause of some advantages in competitiveness and because of pre-
ferential treatment with regard to third countries.
VII. Prospects for the ALADI Market
The ALADI market represented the most important outlet for Brazil
exports of manufactured goods, at the beginning of its formidable
expansion. This dominance began to weaken as from the mid-1970s,
and suffered a considerable drop between 1982-84. Though it un-
doubtedly meant the vital field of first trial for the Brazilian
export industry, it is no longer even its most important market
within the developing world.
Two questions are of relevance for the immediate future. The
first concerns the possibility that the recent relative decline
in the importance of the ALADI market may be overcome, once some
of those Latin American countries regain economic dynamism, a
process which is intimately linked to a more outward-orientated
profile. The second question concerns the eventual effects of the
For a discussion of the problems involved with the creation of
an artificial currency unit for the explicit use among develop-
ing countries see Fischer (1984: pp. 321-322).- 27 -
new regional tariff preference scheme in ALADI, and of the bila-
teral pacts, upon the eventual reactivation of intra-regional
trade.
It seems plausible that ALADI demand for Brazilian manufactures
may reactivate in the near future, though it is unlikely to re-
gain its dominant position within the developing world. The new
multilateral tariff preference scheme seems unlikely to determine
much of these flows, unless a substantial upgrading of the pre-
ferential rates is put into effect. As has been seen in the case
of the latest agreements with Argentina, Brazil continues its
policy of specific bilateral trade agreements on a more selective
basis with broader political perspectives as well as with a larg-
er set of monetary and trade policy instruments. This set may
include short-term reciprocity pacts between state-controlled
companies, barter trade, border trade and exclusive payment
units.
As experience has witnessed, such instruments of integration
planning are subject to instability and very discretionary ad hoc
measures. Hence, trade relations based on such measures are
threatened by volatility and political vulnerability. In the
medium run, they seem to be clearly inferior to a stable policy
framework designed to balance the incentive system between do-
mestic production and export production. There does not seem to
exist an equivalent substitute in bilateral trade relations which
could maintain the competitive status of Brazilian products on
ALADI markets as it developed beyond a preferential status over
the two last decades.- 28 -













































































































































































































































































Identification syrribol in Spanish. Abbreviation stands for "Partial Scope Agreement/
**
Trade". - Trade Agreement No. 8 expired on 03/31/85.

















































































































Source: Sintesis ALADI, 1984, No. 4, p. 22-23.- 32 -
Appendix A3
Examples for non-tariff barriers in some ALADI member countries
1984
Argentina. Import prohibitions represent 23 per cent of the cu-
stom list. A Further 29 per cent is subjected to previous licens-
ing.
Brazil. Import prohibitions represent 42 per cent of the custom
list; this category represents 87 per cent in the agricultural
sector, 93 per cent in textiles and clothing, 80 per cent in
timber, paper. Free sectors are considered to be chemical, metal-
lurgy, and capital goods.
Colombia. 60 per cent of the custom list is subjected to previous
licensing.
Ecuador. Import prohibitions represent 30 per cent of the custom
list.
Mexico. 82 per cent of the custom list is subjected to previous
licensing. In sectors like chemicals and minerals the range is
lower, about 6 7 per cent.
Venezuela. Only 27 per cent of the custom list is under some type
of non-tariff restriction. Of this fraction, 32 per cent of the
items are prohibited and 62 per cent are authorised by the cen-
tral government.
Source: Sintesis ALADI, 1984, No. 4, p. 22-23.Statistical Appendix
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Sources: UN Commodity Trade Statistics, various issues; own calculation.- 36 -
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